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Abstract:This study consists of an examination of productivity growth following three major technological 
breakthroughs: the steam power revolution, electrification and the ICT revolution. The distinction between sectors 
producing and sectors using the new technology is emphasized. A major finding for all breakthroughs is that there 
is a long lag from the time of the original invention until a substantial increase in the rate of productivity growth 
can be observed. There is also strong evidence of rapid price decreases for steam engines, electricity, electric 
motors and ICT products. However, there is no persuasive direct evidence that the steam engine producing 
industry and electric machinery had particularly high productivity growth rates. For the ICT revolution the highest 
productivity growth rates are found in the ICT-producing industries. We suggest that one explanation could be 
that hedonic price indexes are not used for the steam engine and the electric motor. Still, it is likely that the rate of 
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According to many observers (e.g., Castells 1996, 1997; Greenwood 1997; Litan and Rivlin 
2001) we have just experienced a technological revolution based on a breakthrough in 
information and communication technology (ICT). This revolution has already profoundly 
impacted the way we lead our lives and produce goods and services. Moreover, significantly 
higher rates of productivity growth were observed in the latter half of the 1990s compared to 
the 1970s and 1980s, in particular in the United States. This tendency was discernible in 
several other countries too, but on closer inspection it appears that it may only be true for the 
sectors producing the new technology. Still, towards the very end of the last millenium the ICT 
revolution carried high hopes for a new era, ”a new economy”, entailing a permanent upward 
shift in long-term productivity growth rates. Or as one extremely influential policymaker at the 
time put it: ”the recent acceleration in labor productivity is not just a cyclical phenomenon or a 
statistical aberration, but reflects – at least in part – a more deep-seated, still developing, shift 
in our economic landscape” (Greenspan 1999, p. 3). 
 
Throughout human history there have been a number of important technological 
breakthroughs. Schumpeter (1939) argued that new products and technologies, giving rise to 
“gales of creative destruction”, would have a large impact on the economy for several decades. 
But how can we distinguish truly revolutionary changes from other changes? Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg’s (1995) concept of a General Purpose Technology (GPT) is useful in this context. 
They argue that whole eras of technical progress are driven by a few GPTs, characterized by 
pervasiveness, inherent potential for technical improvements and innovational 
complementarities giving rise to increasing returns to scale. GPTs are believed to play a 
decisive role for long-term productivity development as the new technology is diffused 
throughout different sectors of the economy (Helpman and Trajtenberg 1998). More 
specifically, Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw (1998) maintain that a GPT has the following four 
characteristics: (1) wide scope for improvement and elaboration; (2) applicability across a 
broad range of uses; (3) potential usefulness in a wide range of products and processes; and (4) 
strong complementarities with existing or potential new technologies.  
 
However, as noted by David and Wright (2003), based on these criteria Lipsey et al. (1998) 
come up with a list of GPTs that is so lengthy that the term revolutionary becomes grossly 
devalued. Hence, the GPT framework has limitations when it comes to distinguishing 
revolutionary technologies from new technologies of lesser importance. Moreover, it can be 
argued that the GPT framework also suffers from ex post bias. A clear set of criteria to 
distinguish among all possible technologies and not simply an ex post definition of the  
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technologies that matter would be highly useful, but such an analysis is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  
 
The GPT framework can be compared with the broader concept of techno-economic paradigm 
(TEP) (Perez 1983; Freeman and Soete 1987). According to Freeman (1987) a TEP is a 
systematic relationship among products, processes, organizations and institutions that 
coordinate economic activity. Changes of TEPs are pervasive changes in technology affecting 
many branches of the economy and giving rise to entirely new sectors. A characteristic of this 
type of technical change is that it affects the input cost structure and the conditions of 
production and distribution for almost every branch of the economy. The definition of a GPT is 
more precise than the definition of a techno-economic paradigm. However, the TEP literature 
clearly distinguishes between “deeper conceptual breakthroughs” and subcategories that 
presuppose the deeper change (e.g., the steam engine vs. railways and steamships, the internal 
combustion engine vs. motor vehicles and the integrated circuit vs. personal computers and the 
Internet).  
 
By using the criteria suggested by the GPT and TEP perspectives on technological 
breakthroughs and focusing on the period since the eve of the Industrial Revolution in the UK, 
we reach the conclusion that the number of innovations that can rival the ICT revolution in 
importance is exceptionally small. Arguably, there are only three innovations that qualify: the 
steam engine, the internal combustion engine, and electrification.  
 
But what impact does a major technological breakthrough have on the economy, notably on the 
level and rate of growth of productivity? How long does it take before the new technology has 
spread throughout the economy, fundamentally altering modes and patterns of production and 
consumption? The purpose of this paper is to explore these questions. In particular, we intend 
to explore whether each breakthrough is unique in its effects or whether one can detect a 
general pattern. We will compare the effects of three technological breakthroughs, namely the 
steam power revolution, electrification, and the ICT revolution.
1 Our paper is purely empirical 
and we have no pretension to make any conceptual or theoretical contribution to the GPT or 
TEP literature. The questions above are very broad, and more specifically we address the 
following questions:  
 
(i)  Have these technological breakthroughs been important for productivity growth?  
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(ii)  What similarities and dissimilarities are there between technological breakthroughs? 
(iii)  What similarities can be found in the pattern of productivity growth after the 
breakthroughs and do they differ across countries? 
(iv)  Is productivity growth different in sectors producing the new technology compared to 
sectors using it? 
 
Most studies that compare technological breakthroughs use either a macroeconomic 
perspective based on quantitative data or a microeconomic perspective based on qualitative 
data. We believe that the questions above must be analyzed with a combination of different 
perspectives, including the micro, macro, and industry levels. By combining these three 
perspectives and analyzing three major technological breakthroughs, it will be possible to gain 
new knowledge on the impact of different technological breakthroughs on productivity growth. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists of a methodological discussion related to 
our investigation. In sections 3–5 we examine each technological breakthrough in detail and 
investigate its impact on productivity growth. Finally, we analyze our results from all three 
breakthroughs in order to find answers to the above questions. Our results show that it takes a 
long time from the moment of the original invention until a substantial increase in the rate of 
productivity growth can be observed. For the steam engine this was about 140 years (90 if the 
Watt steam engine is treated as the original innovation), while it was 40–50 years for 
electrification and the ICT revolution. We also find evidence of rapid price decreases for steam 
engines, electricity, electric motors and ICT products. This indicates rapid productivity growth 
in the industries producing the new technology. However, we cannot find direct evidence that 
the steam engine producing industry in the UK and the electric machinery industry in the US 
had particularly high productivity growth rates. For the ICT revolution the highest productivity 
growth rates were found for the ICT-producing industries throughout the six countries that we 
investigate. 
 
2. Methodological Discussion 
For the steam engine and electrification we will use secondary sources covering primarily 
Germany, Sweden, the UK and the US. For the ICT revolution we will present evidence from 
six different countries: Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, the UK and the US. Our 
investigation rests on empirical data mostly drawn from quantitative research. This raises 
                                                                                                                                                            
1 We do not examine the impact of the internal combustion engine. The reason for this omission is purely 
pragmatic. The body of literature is meager and the introduction of the internal combustion engine largely 
coincides with electrification.   
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issues concerning sources, concepts and productivity measurement. Before we delve into these 
matters it should be stressed that it is extremely hard, perhaps infeasible, to come up with 
“sharp” tests of causal effects from new GPTs to significant productivity growth, in particular 
concerning GPTs introduced long ago. There are long lags involved, the real world is 
exceedingly complex and general patterns are unlikely to repeat themselves from one GPT to 
the next in closely similar fashions. Instead we have to content ourselves with exploratory 
analyses with the aim of documenting whether identified patterns are consistent with fairly 
loosely formulated hypotheses.  
 
2.1 Sources 
For the ICT revolution we use primary data taken from the OECD Structural Analysis 
industrial database (STAN) (OECD 2003b) to analyze sectoral productivity in manufacturing 
for six countries.
2 The inclusion of Germany, France and Finland gives us a more complete 
picture of productivity development for Western European countries. Given that we include the 
three largest countries in Europe and two countries from northern Europe with a high degree of 
specialization in ICT-producing industries, we judge that our results can be seen as reasonably 
representative for the most recent breakthrough.  
 
For the steam engine we primarily focus on the UK productivity development, while most of 
the evidence about electrification comes from the US. This is almost wholly due to data 
constraints. We are aware that this limitation may exclude important parts of the complex 
process of technological development and its implications for productivity growth. It is evident 
that technological processes may have evolved differently across countries, not least as a result 
of sizeable institutional differences. 
 
Another limitation of our study is that we primarily, but not exclusively, focus on the impact of 
the new GPT on productivity in manufacturing, despite the fact that a large part of overall 
technological change takes place outside manufacturing. Difficulties in measuring productivity 
in the service sector and the ensuing lack of data force us to accept this limitation. 
 
                                                 
2 For the US we also use data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(2005).  
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2.2 Data quality and measurement issues 
We will present estimates both of labor productivity growth and total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth.
3 The data presented for earlier technological breakthroughs should be used with 
caution. Nevertheless, the available data make it possible to gain a better understanding of the 
general patterns of productivity development. Mokyr (1993) argues that if it is true that in 
modern industrial societies, the construction of national income statistics gives rise to 
theoretical and data problems, for 18
th-century Britain the problems are much greater and 
national income estimates can only be “controlled conjectures”. Nonetheless, growth cannot be 
analyzed without them. Hence, when we write that “the growth rate was x percent” during a 
certain period this always mean estimated to be x percent by the cited author(s) given all the 
limitations of the study in question. As long as numerous independent sources are used and the 
data are viewed with these caveats in mind, we deem that the quality and accuracy of 
productivity data for earlier technological breakthroughs is sufficiently high to warrant 
conclusions about productivity development and the diffusion of the technology in the 
economy. 
 
Another issue concerns the use of hedonic price indices.
4 The hedonic approach to price 
measurement is used to take quality changes into account. It redefines goods in terms of their 
characteristics so that modified or new models do not open up a new product category, but 
simply represent a new combination of characteristics (Scarpetta et al. 2000). There are no 
consistent hedonic price indices available for steam power and electrification.
5 For the ICT 
revolution hedonic price indices are used to adjust quality change in output for some countries. 
France, Sweden and the US use hedonic adjustments for some ICT products, while Finland, 
Germany and the UK do not (Scarpetta et al. 2000). Cross-country comparability of output and 
productivity could thus be impaired in sectors with rapidly falling prices such as the computer 
industry. 
 
                                                 
3 Labor productivity is usually based on data of value added and labor input. TFP estimates are based on data for 
value added, employment, hours worked, capital stock, and factor shares. TFP accounts for the effect of capital 
input on productivity, but the measure is derived on the assumption that the marginal products of labor and capital 
are equal to their respective market prices and that production is characterized by constant returns to scale. 
4 A hedonic price index is any price index that makes use of a hedonic function. A hedonic function is a relation 
between the prices of different varieties of a product, such as the various models of personal computers, and the 
quantities of characteristics in them (Triplett 2004). Hedonic price indices are further discussed in section 6.2. 
5 Section 4.3 includes estimates of hedonic price indices for electric motors based on Edquist (2005a).  
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3. The steam engine 
3.1 The early development of the steam engine 
The first widely used steam engine was invented by Thomas Newcomen in 1712. The 
Newcomen engine was mostly used in mining and consumed relatively large amounts of coal. 
It took several decades for the steam engine to become modified for productivity enhancing use 
and to diffuse among countries and industries. In 1765 James Watt developed the separate 
condenser (patented in 1769). Watt realized that if the main cylinder could be kept hot all the 
time, and condensation occurred in a separate cold vessel, fuel-savings could be fourfold 
(Mokyr 1994). The fuel-saving innovation made it possible to use the steam engine at locations 
where coal was scarce (Nuvolari and Verbong 2001). Thanks to Watt’s innovation the steam 
engine could become an important power source in factories (Robertson 1955). 
 
However, the Watt steam engine had serious limitations and it was not until reliable high 
pressure boilers were developed and put to effective use in the 1840s (the Lancashire boiler; 
Crafts 2004) that steam power could be deployed on a large scale in factories and 
transportation (railways and sea vessels). A further important improvement was the 
introduction of the Corliss engine in the early 1860s (Rosenberg and Trajtenberg 2004).
6 In 
particular, the switch to steam ships hinged crucially on the introduction of high-pressure 
steam and in fact steam ships did not replace sailing ships to any great extent until the late 
1800s.  
 
3.2 The diffusion of the steam engine 
Table 1 presents crude estimates of total steam power capacity in 15 different countries in 
1840–96.
7 According to Table 1 the US and the UK had the highest steam power capacity in 
1840 totaling 760,000 and 620,000 horsepower, respectively.
8 Thus, these two countries 
accounted for more than 80 percent of the total world steam power capacity in 1840. At that 
point other large European countries, such as France and Germany, had a modest steam power 
capacity in relation to the UK and the US. However, the growth rate of steam power capacity 
was higher between 1840 and 1896 for all other countries included in Table 1. Germany had 
the highest annual growth rate in steam power capacity (9.9 percent p.a.). Hence, most 
countries caught up with the UK and the US during the second half of the 19
th century. 
                                                 
6 The Corliss engine had more advanced valves that allowed a much greater fuel efficiency and a uniform and 
uninterrupted flow of power. 
7 The steam power capacity estimates in Table 1 include capacity of fixed, railway and shipping steam power.  
8 The standard unit for measuring power capacity is horsepower, where one unit is equivalent to a rate of 550 foot-
pounds per second.  
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In 1896 the US and UK share of world steam power capacity had decreased to 48 percent. 
Nevertheless, the UK had the highest capacity per inhabitant in 1896/97. Table 1 shows that 
the steam power capacity per 100 inhabitants in 1896/97 was 34 horsepower for the UK 
compared to 25 for the US. The corresponding figures for France and Germany were 15 
horsepower. Portugal, Russia and Italy had the lowest capacity per 100 inhabitants (see Table 
1). Hence the catch up was far from complete.  
 
In manufacturing, the steam engine was first adopted in the UK, but the initial adoption was 
slow. According to Nuvolari and Castaldi (2003) the total number of steam engines installed in 
British mining and manufacturing in 1800 was only 2,191. The price difference between steam 
power and waterpower remained high. However, the cost disadvantage was gradually 
overcome by the mobility advantage and the increased efficiency of new generations of steam 
engines (Atack et al. 1980).  
 
The initial adoption of steam power in US manufacturing was even slower. According to Atack 
et al. (1980) there was only one manufacturing plant using steam power in the US before 1776 
compared to 130 in Britain. In 1838 the total steam power capacity in US manufacturing was 
36,100 horsepower (Atack et al. 1980). A crude estimate of the corresponding figure for the 
UK was 350,000 horsepower (Tann 1988). These figures, although crude, suggest that by the 
1840s the UK was far ahead of the US in steam power capacity in manufacturing. But once 
adoption gained momentum in the US it became rapid. By 1869 the total power capacity in US 
manufacturing had increased to 1,216,000 horsepower. Around 1820 waterwheels probably 
outnumbered steam engines by 100 to 1 in the US, but by 1870 this difference had narrowed to 
about 5 to 4 (Atack et al. 1980). These figures indicate that the breakthrough in the diffusion of 
the steam engine in the US manufacturing took place in the middle of the century. Fenichel 




                                                 
9 Primary power means the work done by “prime movers” which convert energy of nature directly into the energy 
of motion.   
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3.3 The steam engine and productivity growth 
3.3.1 Steam power development in the UK 
One way to investigate the impact of the steam engine on productivity growth is to analyze 
how TFP developed during the period when the steam engine was introduced in 
manufacturing. Most evidence indicates that the growth in output and TFP in the UK did not 
increase until the beginning of the 19
th century (see Table 2). This was more than 35 years after 
the invention of Watt’s steam engine and 90 years after Newcomen’s engine. Crafts (2004) 
argues that productivity growth did not increase substantially until the 1850s (see Table 2). 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
But can the increase in TFP and labor productivity growth in the UK be ascribed to the 
introduction of the steam engine? Several studies suggest that the impact of steam power on 
TFP growth was quite small (see Von Tunzelmann 1978 and Crafts 2004). Moreover, there are 
few indications that the steam engine had a substantial productivity-enhancing effect initially. 
One way of measuring the contribution of new technology is to use the concept of social 
savings. Social savings are usually measured as the gain in consumer surplus from the fall in 
costs due to new technology.
10 Estimates of social savings are invariably small for the steam 
engine. Von Tunzelmann (1978) estimates that the savings from using Watt’s engines over 
Newcomen’s in 1800 were approximately 0.11 percent of national income.  
 
Crafts (2004) analyses the impact of steam engines on British labor productivity growth by 
using the growth accounting framework that Oliner and Sichel (2000) developed to assess the 
impact of ICT on US labor productivity growth.
11 Table 3 reports Crafts’ estimates of the 
contribution of stationary steam engines, railways and steamships to British labor productivity 
growth in 1760–1910. Table 3 shows that the impact of steam technology on labor productivity 
growth, measured as the increase in steam power capital in all sectors as a share of total income 
and TFP growth in the steam power industry as a share of total output, was 0.01–0.02 
percentage points per year throughout the period 1760–1830.
12 During 1830–50, the 
contribution of steam technology increased to 0.2 percentage points of the annual labor 
                                                 
10 This approach was applied to railroads in Fogel’s (1964) famous study. 
11 Oliner and Sichel (2000) identify the contribution from ICT to labor productivity growth as three types of ICT 
capital deepening (computer hardware, software and communication equipment) weighted by the shares of these 
types of capital in income and through TFP growth in the ICT-producing industry weighted by its share in gross 
output. 
12 Crafts (2004) does not calculate the rate of technical change in steam power as a TFP residual, instead he 
estimates the TFP as the aggregate social savings determined by the reductions in steam power costs.  
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productivity growth of 1.65 percent (see Table 3).
13 In 1850–1910 the contribution of steam 
increased to 0.31–0.41 percentage points.
14 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The increase in the contribution of steam technology to labor productivity growth during the 
second half of the 19
th century was to a great extent due to the large investments in railways 
during the period. For example, in 1830–1850 railways contributed 0.16 percentage points to 
labor productivity growth, while the contribution from stationary steam engines was estimated 
to be a mere 0.04 percentage points. It is important to point out that the railway industry was 
not producing steam engines, but rather using steam power technology. Moreover, it was not 
until after 1850 that the contribution of steam technology to labor productivity growth 
increased. However, the contribution from the stationary steam engine producing industry 
never exceeded 17 percent of total labor productivity growth.  
 
Crafts’ (2004) estimates show that the steam engine had little influence on labor productivity 
growth in the period 1760–1850. This suggests that 140 years after Newcomen’s steam engine 
and 85 years after Watt’s steam engine, no substantial TFP growth had taken place within the 
steam power producing industry. However, after 1850 steam technology started to contribute 
more to labor productivity growth. This time period coincides with the introduction of the high 
pressure steam engine. Steam engine capacity also increased rapidly during this period. In 1830 
total steam power capacity in the UK was 160,000 horsepower compared to 2.06 million in 
1870 and 9.65 million in 1907 (Kanefsky 1979; Crafts 2004). Hence, capacity in terms of 
horsepower grew by 5.5 percent p.a. in the 1830–1907 period.  
 
Crafts’ growth accounting approach also has shortcomings. Field (2006a) argues that the key 
message of the social savings approach is that in the absence of new technology the saving 
flows would have been invested elsewhere. This would have resulted in economic growth, 
although not quite as large. According to Fogel (1964) this meant canals and river dredging in 
the hypothetical absence of the railroad.
15 Fogel estimated that in 1890 GNP was 4 percent 
higher as a result of the railroad. The approach used by Crafts includes the portion of the effect 
of capital deepening on labor productivity that is the consequence of the accumulation of 
particular steam engine capital goods. As pointed out by Field (2006a) the message of the 
                                                 
13 The average annual labor productivity growth of 1.65 percent refers to the years 1931–73. 
14 Annual labor productivity growth in Britain averaged 1.65 percent in 1873–1899 and 0.85 percent in 1899–1913 
(see Table 2).  
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Fogel approach is that in the absence of the steam engine, capital would have been 
accumulated in a slightly inferior range of capital goods. As a result, the growth accounting 
approach used by, inter alia, Crafts (2004) and Oliner and Sichel (2000) may overestimate the 
impact of the new technology. 
 
However, it is also possible to argue that the growth accounting approach underestimates the 
impact of the steam engine, since it does not take account of spillover effects from the steam 
power producing industry to steam power using industries.
16 It is possible that increased 
flexibility and reliability due to the introduction of the steam engine in the production process 
could have generated substantial productivity growth in manufacturing industries using the 
new steam power technology. Nuvolari and Castaldi (2003) maintain that if the steam 
technology stimulated the generation of further technical or organizational innovations in 
sectors applying the new GPT, its economic impact cannot be appropriately assessed by means 
of growth accounting and social savings. 
 
Table 3 indicated that the stationary steam engine producing industry did not have a large 
impact on aggregate productivity growth in 1760–1910 (see Table 3). However, the steam 
engine may have had an impact on productivity in other sectors of the economy. Even though 
aggregate TFP growth was low in the UK it seems that some sectors experienced very high 
growth rates thanks to the introduction of the steam engine in their production processes. Table 
4 shows that steam power was used intensively in a few industries only. Throughout the period 
1800–1907 mining, textiles, and metal manufactures accounted for more than 50 percent of the 
steam industrial power (Nuvolari and Castaldi 2003). However, important sectors including 
agriculture and the service sector excepting transport were in fact very slow at adopting the 
steam engine (Crafts 2004). This might be the reason why productivity growth stemming from 
the steam engine did not result in high aggregate productivity growth in the UK during this 
period.  
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
So which industries experienced the highest productivity growth? McCloskey (1981) estimates 
total factor productivity growth for a number of individual industries. McCloskey’s figures 
have been widely criticized. Harley (1993) claims that McCloskey exaggerated productivity 
                                                                                                                                                            
15 The approach assumes that aggregate saving flows would have been largely unaffected by the absence of the 
particular innovation under study.  
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growth in several industries (cotton, wool, and shipping). In Table 5 the average annual TFP 
growth for different industries in 1780–1860 are presented based on both McCloskey (1981) 
and Harley (1993). The figures indicate that productivity estimates for different industries must 
be analyzed with caution. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some conclusions. It is, for 
example, evident that the textile industry had a high rate of productivity growth during this 
period. The textile industry was also an intensive user of steam power (see Table 4). 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
An important issue is how productivity increased in the sector producing steam engines.
17 By 
the size of the output shares for production of steam it is clear that the steam power producing 
industry was small compared to the rest of the economy. Crafts (2004) argues that in the period 
1800–1840 there were few innovations in the steam power producing industry and the costs of 
steam engines did not fall. The subsequent period of rapid innovation resulted in large cost 
reductions. One of these innovations was the automatic variable cut-off mechanism of the 
Corliss steam engine that resulted in substantial improvement in fuel efficiency in the mid 19
th 
century (Rosenberg and Trajtenberg 2004). Hence, the price of steam power had approximately 
halved by the mid-1850s and in 1910 the annual cost of steam horsepower had fallen by 
approximately 80 percent compared to the beginning of the 19
th century (Crafts 2004). These 
observations suggest rapid productivity growth in the steam engine producing industry after 
1850.  
 
3.3.2 Steam power development in other countries 
As already noted considerable time elapsed before the steam engine diffused in the US. 
According to Robertson (1955) the British sought to prevent export of the steam engine abroad. 
By 1838 only 5 percent of the total power used in US manufacturing was generated by steam 
engines. Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2004) argue that it was not until around 1850 when the 
Corliss engine was introduced in the manufacturing process, that steam started having a 
substantial impact on productivity growth in the US. As in the UK, textiles, primary metals and 
machinery industries were the key industries in the process of industrialization. The fraction of 
power generated from steam increased in the textile and primary metals industries from 1/4 in 
                                                                                                                                                            
16 We define spillovers as increases in labor productivity in the using sectors beyond what one would expect from 
the capital deepening effect alone. In other words, spillover effects are the contribution to TFP growth in the using 
sectors resulting from the introduction of the new technology. 
17 The estimates of TFP growth in the steam engine producing industry is based on an incomplete data set and 
should therefore be analyzed with caution.  
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1870 to 1/3 in 1910. However, by then another key technology had started to change the 
production process in manufacturing. 
 
For Finland, France, Germany, and Sweden we have been unable to uncover sufficient data to 
accurately investigate the impact of steam power on productivity growth. From a 
macroeconomic perspective the productivity and growth increases took place later in these 
countries compared to the UK (Fisher 1992). For the period 1820–70 GDP per capita growth in 
Germany was 0.7 percent p.a. The corresponding figures for Sweden and France were 0.7 and 
0.8 percent p.a., respectively (Maddison 1991). However, it has not been possible to investigate 
the importance of steam power for this development. 
 
3.4 Concluding remarks on the development of steam power 
Aggregate productivity growth did not accelerate until after 1850 in the UK, i.e. 140 and 85 
years after Newcomen’s and Watt’s steam engines were invented. Hence, one cannot detect an 
effect on TFP until quite long after the invention had been made. Crafts and Mills (2004) note 
that “the contribution of steam power to industrial output and labor productivity was at its 
strongest after 1870”. One interpretation of this is that the real potential of steam technology 
did not materialize until the high pressure steam engine had been invented. From this invention 
until sizable productivity effects could be detected no more than 20–40 years elapsed.  
 
Furthermore, most of the productivity increases for the period appeared in sectors that were 
using the steam engine intensively, i.e. textiles and railways. The cost of steam power fell 
rapidly after 1840 as a result of a series of technical improvements of the original design. 
Notably, this opened the way for intensive use of the steam engine in the transportation sector. 
This may indicate a high productivity growth in the steam engine producing industry after all. 
However, the output of the steam engine producing industry remained less than 1 percent of 
total output in the UK throughout the 1760–1860 period. This could be one reason why the 





We now switch the main focus from the role of the steam engine in British manufacturing to 
the US electrification process. The focus on US manufacturing is governed by data availability.  
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To the greatest extent possible we also present complementary evidence from other countries, 
notably Sweden and the UK.  
 
The invention of the dynamo was crucial for the 19
th century electric industry. The principle 
behind the dynamo – the theory of electromagnetic induction – was discovered by Michael 
Faraday in 1831 (Byatt 1979). However, it took over forty years until the dynamo could be 
used commercially. The basic technological innovations raising energy efficiency in electricity 
generation to levels permitting commercial application occurred during 1856–1880 (David 
1991). In 1867 a number of inventors came up with the idea of using an electromagnetic field 
energized by the dynamo itself. The Gramm dynamo was based on this principle and was able 
to generate electricity inexpensively enough for the commercial use of electric lightning. Other 
inventions such as the Swann-Edison lamp in 1879 and the Edison central generating station in 
New York and London in 1881 were also important for the diffusion of electricity. Moreover, 
innovations such as transformers and alternators made it possible to use alternating current 
instead of direct current, which substantially lowered costs for transmitting electricity. 
 
4.1 Diffusion of electricity 
Electric energy in the 19
th century was produced by prime movers driven primarily by falling 
water (hydroelectric power) or by steam (thermal power).
18 Electricity is not a prime mover, 
but rather a form of energy that is easy to transport from the power source to the end user, 
which gives rise to efficiency and flexibility gains. The process of electrification began in the 
1880s both in Europe and the US (Goldfarb 2005; Hughes 1983; Byatt 1979; Landes 1969). In 
the beginning, application was largely limited to lightning. Later, electrification spread to 
tramways and railways. Innovations such as the electric motor eventually came to revolutionize 
manufacturing. The large-scale use of motors in manufacturing started around 1900 in the UK. 
By 1907 electric motors in factories consumed about half of the total amount of electricity 
produced, and by 1912 factories used three times as much electricity as did traction (Byatt 
1979). 
 
The industries of other large European countries, such as Germany and France, were also 
rapidly electrified in the late 19
th and early 20
th century (Milward and Saul 1977). According to 
Landes (1969) the most striking achievements occurred in Germany. In 1907 the capacity of 
                                                 
18 According to Du Boff (1979) a prime mover is an engine that utilizes the potential energy of nature and directly 
converts it into energy of motion. Modern mechanical prime movers are the steam engine, the steam turbine, the 
hydro turbine, the internal combustion engine and the jet turbine.  
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electric generators in Germany and the UK was roughly the same.
19 However, in 1925 the total 
capacity of German electric generators was 13,288,800 horsepower compared to 8,510,000 for 
the UK. Moreover, German companies such as Siemens & Halske and Allgemeine 
Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG) became world leading manufacturers of electric equipment 
(Hughes 1983). In 1913 the German electric machinery industry was twice as big as that of 
Britain and only slightly smaller than in the US (Landes 1969).  
 
In the US, electricity was first used as a commercial power source in 1882. The use of 
electricity in manufacturing increased slowly. In 1899, 4 percent of the total primary 
horsepower capacity in manufacturing used energy from purchased or firm-generated electric 
power. This had risen to 21 percent in 1909, 50 percent in 1919 and 75 percent in 1929 (Woolf 
1984). Table 6 presents figures from Du Boff (1979) for total primary capacity in 
manufacturing divided into non-electric capacity and electric motor capacity. The figures 
indicate that the rapid expansion of purchased and firm-generated electricity was somewhat 
more modest compared to what Woolf argues. Still, the expansion of primary and secondary 
electric motors was rapid.
20 Moreover, the adoption of electricity was very uniformly 
distributed across manufacturing industries (Jovanovic and Rousseau 2005). 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 7 compares electrification in five manufacturing industries in the UK and the US. Even 
though the figures are not fully comparable some conclusions may be drawn. The figures point 
to large differences in the electrification process across industries in both countries. Industries 
such as engineering, shipbuilding and vehicles and chemicals were electrified much more 
rapidly compared to cotton textiles and coal mining. In iron and steel, coal mining, and cotton 
textiles Britain lagged behind the US. Byatt (1979) documents that these industries were slow 
in adopting electric motors in their production processes compared to both the US and 
Germany. Moreover, according to estimates by Broadberry (1997), the US/UK relative labor 
productivity level in the cotton industry increased from 151 in 1909/07 to 174 in 1914/12. 
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
19 Landes (1969) estimates are based on the industrial censuses in Germany and the UK in 1907. According to 
these estimates, the capacity of electric generators in the UK and Germany was 2,341,900 and 1,830,000 
horsepower respectively. However, the British figures are based on capacity of engines and motors, while the 
German the power produced in regular operation. 
20 Primary electric motors are those driven by electricity purchased from utilities outside the manufacturing plant. 
Secondary motors are driven by electricity from generators and prime movers within the plant itself. They 
represent no addition to power available for use, since some of the plant’s own power generating capacity must be 
employed to generate their electric energy (du Boff 1979).  
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Why did Britain lag behind both Germany and the US in adopting electric motors in 
manufacturing? It appears that mining and textile industries that were early in adopting the 
steam engine in their production processes in Britain were much slower in adopting electricity  
compared, for example, to chemicals and engineering, or shipbuilding and vehicles (see Table 
7). One possible explanation for this is that the large investments in steam engines made those 
industries reluctant to invest in new electric technology. This suggests that technological 
choices are often path dependent and are not always socially optimal. Similar evidence from 
other areas supports this view (see David 1985). It is interesting to note that the US textile 
industry quickly switched from steam to electricity. In fact, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) 
find that the industries that quickly switched to electricity had been heavy users of steam. One 
parallel that comes to mind is the Gerschenkron (1952) thesis that “relative backwardness” 
may facilitate economic growth, since it is easier to imitate the technologically leading 
countries. Similarly, a new GPT may be more readily adopted in a country where the previous 
GPT has not yet become so deeply entrenched.  
 
In Sweden, electricity started to be used in lightning in 1876. In 1885 there existed 111 
dynamos with a capacity of 1036 horsepower (Hjulström 1940). The diffusion of electricity 
was rapid in Swedish industries. Sweden was also successful in innovation that permitted 
electricity to be transmitted over long distances without substantial power losses (Schön 1990). 
Initially, the primary source of electricity was steam power; in 1885 82 percent of the 
electricity produced came from steam power and the remainder from hydropower. In 1900 the 
relationship was largely reversed and 60 percent of the electricity was produced by hydropower 
(Hjulström 1940). 
 
Swedish manufacturing rapidly adopted electricity in the production process. Figure 1 shows 
the development of Swedish electric motor capacity in the manufacturing and handicraft 
industry. It is evident that Swedish manufacturing was electrified very rapidly at the beginning 
of the 20
th century. From 1906 to 1937 the power capacity of electric motors increased more 
than twenty fold. Which industries were then electrified most rapidly? 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 8 shows that electric motor capacity increased in all industries throughout the period 
investigated. For the period 1913–1931 the most rapid expansion took place in wood and cork 
with a capacity increase of 452 percent. Food manufacturing, leather, furs and rubber products,  
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and Non-metallic mining and quarrying also experienced increases exceeding 300 percent in 
their electric motor capacity in 1913–1931. The growth was slowest in textiles, wearing 
apparel and made-up textile goods – which is in accordance with the findings for the UK 
presented earlier. 
 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2 Electricity and productivity growth 
4.2.1 Productivity development in the US 
Table 9 presents estimates of the compound annual growth rate of labor and TFP growth in the 
US non-farm business sector 1889–1948. Productivity growth is measured from peak to peak 
over the business cycle. According to Field (2003) choosing business cycle peaks for 
beginning and end points largely controls for the variations in capacity utilization that occur 
over the business cycle. The results show that labor and total factor productivity growth was 
high during the period 1889–1901. In 1901–19 productivity growth slowed down and it did not 
start to increase until the 1920s. It is unlikely that electrification had a sizable effect on 
productivity growth in 1889–1901. For example, in 1899 only 4 percent of the total primary 
horsepower capacity in manufacturing used energy from purchased or firm-generated electric 
power (see section 4.1). 
 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 10 presents estimates of compound annual labor and TFP growth in US manufacturing 
for different periods. The estimates are based on Kendrick (1961) and Field (2006b).
21 These 
show large increases in both labor productivity and TFP growth in manufacturing for the 
period 1919–1929. The estimated growth rate in labor productivity and TFP was 5.5 and 5.1 
percent, respectively. As in the case of the steam engine several decades elapsed from the 
installation of the first power station producing electricity until there is evidence that 
electrification had a substantial impact on productivity growth within manufacturing. Why did 
productivity growth in manufacturing increase some 40–50 years after the introduction of the 
first commercial electric power stations? And which manufacturing industries experienced the 
highest productivity growth during this period?  
                                                 
21 Kendrick (1961) provides estimates of TFP growth rates within manufacturing for the benchmark years 1929, 
1937 and 1948. According to Field (2006b), 1937 is not a peak of the business cycle. Field has therefore 
calculated TFP growth rates within manufacturing for the subperiods 1929–41 and 1941–48. His calculations are  
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TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
David (1991) argues that it took considerable time for the manufacturing sector to adopt the 
new technology and use it efficiently. According to David electrification paved the way for a 
thorough rationalization of factory construction designs and internal layouts of production. One 
such rationalization was the shift from shafts to wires in the production system (Devine 1983). 
Before electricity was introduced, the production process was built around a large power 
source, such as a waterwheel or a steam engine. The power source turned iron and steel “line 
shafts” via pulleys and leather belts. Often all machines in an entire factory were linked to a 
single power source through these line shafts. The entire network of line shafts rotated 
continuously no matter how many machines were actually in use. If one line shaft broke, 
production stopped in the entire factory. It is evident that production systems built around a 
single power source were very energy consuming and lacked flexibility. 
 
The first electric motors used in production just replaced steam engines and continued to turn 
long line shafts. But, it was soon discovered that large energy savings could be realized if a 
group of machines were driven from a short line shaft turned by its own electric motor. A 
further step was to connect a single electric motor to each machine. This unit drive innovation 
used less energy than the line shaft drive. Yet, the most important economic impact of the unit 
drive system was the increased production process flexibility that it entailed. Machines could 
be run only when needed. Moreover, machines could be organized in a natural sequence for 
manufacturing. In this way the unit drive offered an opportunity to obtain greater output per 
unit of inputs (Devine 1983). 
 
The reorganization of production processes around a new technology turned out to be time 
consuming. David (1991) maintains that it was not until half of the factory mechanical drive 
capacity had been electrified that productivity growth in manufacturing began to increase. In 
addition, David and Wright (2003) point out in some detail that in order for electric power to 
gain full momentum a number of political and institutional changes were also necessary. 
 
Table 11 shows the ratio of primary electric motor capacity to total primary capacity in US 
manufacturing. The data support David’s hypothesis that it was not until the end of the 1920s 
that half of the mechanical drives had been electrified. To support his hypothesis David shows 
                                                                                                                                                            
based on Kendrick’s estimates for output and labor input combined with capital input data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.  
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that there is a correlation between the change in the rate of productivity growth from 1909–19 
to 1919–29 and the ratio of secondary electric motor capacity in 1929 to that capacity in 1919. 
A simple linear (OLS) regression of 15 industries confirms that the increase in secondary 
motor capacity accounts for approximately 25 percent of the variation in productivity growth 
from 1909–1919 to 1919–1929.
22 In subsequent work David and Wright (1999) provide more 
compelling evidence in support of the view that the productivity surge in the 1920s can be 
attributed to the diffusion of a new GPT rather than to multiple, largely unrelated sources.  
 
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
An interesting observation can also be made for the production of electricity and for electric 
machinery. Woolf (1984) finds that there was a substantial increase in the rate of productivity 
growth in the sector producing electricity. In 1902 7.3 lbs of coal was needed to generate one 
kilowatt hour of electricity. In 1917 the figure had fallen to 3.4 lbs and by 1932 only 1.5 lbs 
were needed. Table 12 presents figures from Kendrick (1961) on compound annual labor and 
TFP growth in different manufacturing industries in the US. According to these estimates the 
substantial productivity increase did not appear in the industry producing electric machinery. 
For the period 1919–1929 annual TFP growth in US manufacturing was 5.1 percent, while TFP 
growth in electric machinery was only 3.5 percent per year.
23 The change in TFP growth from 
1909–1919 to 1919–1929 for manufacturing and electric machinery is 4.9 and 3.2 percentage 
points, respectively. Hence, productivity growth increased substantially in the sector producing 
electricity, but not in the sector producing electric machinery. The productivity effects were 
materialized in sectors using electric machinery rather than in sectors producing it.
24 
 
TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2.2 Evidence for other countries 
Table 7 indicates that the UK lagged behind the US in the electrification of many important 
industries. According to Byatt (1979) the UK industry was very slow in investing in electric 
motors. The UK also lagged behind the US in terms of productivity growth. Floud (1994) 
estimates that annual TFP growth in the British economy decreased from 1.4 percent in 1856–
                                                 
22 David’s regression results are based on TFP estimates adjusted for energy inputs based on Woolf (1984). 
However,  David’s OLS regression is still significant when we run the regression with productivity estimates 
based on  Kendrick’s (1961) two input approach (available upon request). 
23 The compound annual labor productivity growth was 5.4 percent in US manufacturing, but only 3.9 percent in 
Electric machinery (see Table 12). 
24 Kendrick (1961) provides estimates at the industry level from 1899. Therefore, it is possible that productivity 
increased in Electric machinery before 1899.  
19 
1873 to 0.5 percent in 1873–1913. Labor productivity growth was slower in the UK relative to 
most other industrialized countries for the period 1913–1950 (Maddison 1991). Why then was 
the UK slower in adopting electricity? 
 
Byatt (1979) argues that investments in electric motors had an impact on the UK economy, but 
not to the same extent as in the US. One reason for the late adoption of electricity in the UK 
could have been that other energy sources were cheaper than electricity. The UK had the most 
developed applications of steam as a power source and it was probably therefore more costly to 
invest in electricity. The evidence indicating that sectors with well-developed steam 
capabilities were slow in investing in electricity supports this explanation. 
 
Table 13 shows annual labor productivity growth for 12 German manufacturing and handicraft 
industries in 1925–38.
25 The estimated total annual labor productivity growth in German 
manufacturing and handicraft was 2.5 percent in 1925–38.
26 Labor productivity was 
particularly high in metal producing, metal processing and chemical industries in the late 
1920s. However during the 1930s, the rate of labor productivity growth decreased considerably 
in the metal producing and metal processing industries, while it remained relatively high in the 
chemical industry. However, throughout the period 1925–38, the chemical and metal 
processing industry had the highest annual labor productivity growth at 4.9 and 3.4 percent, 
respectively.  
 
TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE 
 
When it comes to productivity development in Sweden it appears that Sweden followed the US 
pattern. Schön (2000) shows that labor productivity growth in Swedish manufacturing 
increased from 1.5 percent p.a. in 1896–1910 to 2.9 percent in 1910–1935.
27 Table 14 shows 
labor productivity growth for different industries in the Swedish manufacturing and handicraft 
industries in 1913–39. As in the US, labor productivity growth accelerated in 1919–1929. 
Chemicals and chemical products and power, lightening and waterworks experienced the 
highest rates of productivity growth in 1919–1929. However, as indicated in Table 8, electric 
motor capacity did not increase the most in these industries. Thus, one cannot establish a clear 
correlation between labor productivity growth and the increased use of electric motors for 
different industries within Swedish manufacturing during the years 1919–1929. 
                                                 
25 The figures in Table 13 are based on estimates by Hoffmann (1965). The reliability of Hoffmann’s estimates for 
the period 1850–1913 have been questioned (see Fremdling (1995) and Burhop and Wolff (2005)). Therefore, we 
only report estimates for the period 1925–38. 
26 Hoffmann (1965) does not present any comparable figures for the period 1914–24.  
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TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE 
 
Finland’s productivity growth was similar to the US and Sweden during electrification. 
According to Jalava and Pohjola (2005) annual labor productivity growth in the Finnish non-
residential business sector increased from 1.9 percent in 1900–1913 to 3.1 percent in 1920–38. 
Moreover, they estimate that the use of electrical capital goods contributed 1.2 percentage 
points of the 4.5 percent growth in value added in 1920–38 compared to 0.4 percentage points 
of the 3.0 percent growth in value added in 1900–13. Hence, the contribution of electrical 
capital goods increased from 13 percent of total value added growth in 1900–13 to 27 percent 
in 1920–38. 
 
4.3 Price development of electric motors 
We noted above that compound annual TFP growth in US manufacturing was 5.1 percent, 
while TFP growth in electric machinery was only 3.5 percent in 1919–1929. This suggests that 
the industry actually producing the electrical equipment was not able to take advantage of its 
own technology to the same extent as other industries. Table 15 shows the price development 
for a number of different electric motors (in terms of SEK/horsepower) produced by the 
Swedish company Luth & Rosen during the 1920s.  
 
TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE 
 
According to Table 15 the price of 3–15 horsepower electric motors fell rapidly in Sweden 
during the 1920s. On average prices fell by approximately 70 percent from 1919 to 1929. CPI 
calculations by Myrdal (1933) and Johansson (1967) indicate that total price deflation during 
this period was 37 percent. Hence, the real price of electric motors decreased substantially,
28 
which is a clear indication of productivity gains in the electric motor producing industry in 
Sweden.
29 These results call the productivity findings for US Electric machinery into question. 
It is reasonable to presume that the industry producing the electric motor also should be the 
industry that most rapidly understood how the electric motor could be used efficiently in the 
production process. Moreover, the increase in demand for the electric motor should have 
                                                                                                                                                            
27 Schön (2000) defines labor productivity as real value added per hour worked. 
28 Our own investigation of the price of a 20 horsepower electric motor produced by ASEA for the Swedish 
market show that the nominal price for this motor did not increase at all for the period 1914 to 1935 (ASEA 1914 
and ASEA 1935). Total price inflation during this period was about 35 percent, which provides further evidence 
of a substantial fall in real prices of electric motors.  
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resulted in increased production and thereby allowed the industry to benefit from economies of 
scale.  
 
Table 15 indicates that the price per horsepower fell more rapidly for electric motors with more 
than 5 horsepower. Moreover, a 15 hp electric motor in Sweden was much cheaper in 1929 
compared to a 7.5 hp motor in 1919 both in nominal and real terms. To the extent that 
companies were buying electric motors with higher capacity during the 1920s, the real price of 
motor capacity installed fell even more than what is indicated by the price change of each 
motor category. Finally, it is likely that the quality of an electric motor increased during the 
1920s in terms of reliability, duration etc. Ordinary price indexes do not take such quality 
improvements into account. Edquist (2005a) constructs hedonic and matched model price 
indexes for electric motors in Sweden for the period 1900–35.
30 He finds that during the 1920s, 
PPI-deflated hedonic and matched model price indexes decreased by 4.8 and 3.7 percent per 
year, respectively.  Table 16 shows the estimated labor productivity growth for Electric 
machinery based on the hedonic and matched model price indexes estimated by Edquist 
(2005a).
31 According to Table 16, annual labor productivity growth in the Swedish electric 
machinery industry in 1920–29 was 12.1 and 10.8 percent when hedonic and matched model 
deflators were used. Therefore, there is strong evidence that productivity growth in the 
Swedish electric motor producing industry was very high during the 1920s. However, it is still 
a puzzle why productivity did not increase more in US Electric machinery during the 1920s. 
 
TABLE 16 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.4 Concluding remarks on electrification 
Evidence from the electrification process shows that productivity growth did not increase in 
US manufacturing until the 1920s, i.e. 40 years after the first electric power stations were 
established. Similar patterns can be observed in Sweden and Germany. Electrification took 
place in all the investigated countries in the 1880s. However, British manufacturing was slow 
in adopting the new technology, especially in industries that had a well-developed production 
system based on steam power technology.  
                                                                                                                                                            
29 It is important to point out that a price decline does not necessarily mean that productivity gains have been 
made. A price decline could also be due to increased competition in a specific market. 
30 The hedonic and matched model price indexes are based on prices and characteristics collected for slip-ring 
electric motors with 1–100 horsepower. Thereby, it is assumed that other electric motors would have a similar 
price development.  
31 Labor productivity has been defined as production value per person employed. Unfortunately it has not been 
possible to calculate labor productivity based on value added which implies that only single deflation is used to 
calculate productivity.  
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In the US there was high productivity growth in the sectors producing electricity, but not in the 
industry producing electric machinery. Thus, it appears that the productivity effects were 
largely materialized in sectors using electric machinery rather than in sectors producing it. One 
possible explanation to these findings is that quality improvements were insufficiently 
considered when productivity was measured in the producing industries. As we will see below, 
this stands in contrast to contemporary estimates of productivity in ICT-producing sectors 
where a large part of productivity increases may be attributed to assessed improvements in 
quality. 
 
5. The ICT revolution 
5.1 Background 
In 1947 Bardeen, Brattain, and Shockley invented the transistor. The transistor became the 
basis for numerous electronic innovations. Many of these innovations formed what is called the 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector. During recent decades the ICT 
sector has undergone a technological revolution. The development of numerous innovative 
technologies has given rise to a plethora of new products providing the basis for development 
within the ICT sector. Communication satellites in the 1960s, fiber optic cables in the 1970s 
and cellular telephones first introduced during the 1980s are significant examples of such 
product innovations. The Internet is yet another innovation that is believed by many to be a 
crucial driver of future economic growth (e.g., Litan and Rivlin 2001 and Lipsey et al. 1998). 
 
In this section we investigate the economic impact of the ICT sector on productivity in the US 
and five European countries (Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK). The selection 
of countries was governed by data availability, but there is strong reason to believe that the 
conclusions for these countries are readily applicable to other European countries on a similar 
income level. The following questions will be discussed in depth: (1) What effect has ICT 
investments had on aggregate productivity growth? (2) In which industries can we find 
increased productivity growth? (3) Have there been any spillover effects from ICT-producing 
to the ICT-using industries? 
 
5.2 What is ICT? 
Before analyzing the economic impact of the ICT sector it is important to define ICT. We 
adhere to OECD’s definition. For a manufacturing industry to be defined as an ICT industry,  
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the manufactured products (OECD 2002b): (1) must be intended to fulfill the function of 
information processing and communication including transmission and display; and (2) must 
use electronic processing to detect, measure, and/or record physical phenomena or to control a 
physical process. For a service industry, products must be intended to enable the function of 
information processing and communication by electronic means. 
 
Productivity measurements within the service sector give rise to several measurement 
problems.
32 Therefore we have chosen to focus on manufacturing (see Table 17). For certain 
industries, the OECD definition of ICT-producing industries has been at a very disaggregated 
level. Therefore it is not possible to calculate value added and labor productivity at the 
disaggregated level used in Table 17. The following industries are defined as ICT-producing: 
Office, accounting and computing machinery (ISIC 30), Electric machinery and apparatus 
(ISIC 31), Radio, television and communication equipment (ISIC 32) and Medical, precision 
and optical instruments (ISIC 33). 
 
TABLE 17 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.3 The ICT Revolution and productivity growth 
Despite heavy investments by firms in computers and other ICT technology in the 1970s and 
1980s, productivity growth slowed down in most countries. The first oil crisis has been pointed 
out as one of the explanations for the productivity slowdown (Hulten 2001).
33 Nevertheless, the 
slowdown has remained a puzzle for economists, especially since it occurred when firms 
started to invest in computers that were believed to have a major positive effect on 
productivity.  
 
During the 1990s, ICT investments were extremely large. During 1990–1996, US investments 
in computers rose by 28.3 percent per year (Jorgenson and Stiroh 1999). Sichel (1999) reports 
that the annual increase for computer investments during 1996–1998 was 41.8 percent. 
Calculations also show that ICT accounted for about half of the increase in real capital in the 
US during the period 1990–1996 (Andersson 2001). The available data for OECD countries 
show that ICT investments rose from less than 15 percent of total non-residential investment in 
the business sector in the early 1980s, to between 15 and 35 percent in 2001 (OECD 2004). 
                                                 
32 When measuring productivity in the service sector, it is difficult to determine whether quality improvements for 
produced services have occurred. This problem is further discussed in section 6. Moreover, many statistical 
agencies do not use any consistent method to measure prices in the service sector. 
33 The difficulty for the oil hypothesis has been explaining why low productivity growth rates persisted in the 
1980s after oil prices collapsed.  
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Did these investments have any substantial impact on productivity growth in different 
countries? 
 
In Table 18, we present data for the average annual growth rate of labor productivity for the six 
economies we study, as well as average labor productivity growth for the EU countries.
34 It is 
evident that the US is the only country that experienced a significant increase in the growth rate 
of labor productivity in the late 1990s and early 2000s. None of the other economies shows a 
similar increase in productivity growth during the late 1990s. We can also see that average 
labor productivity growth in EU countries decreased substantially during the second half of the 
1990s. In this respect, development in the EU on the whole has been the opposite of what has 
occurred in the US.  
 
TABLE 18 ABOUT HERE 
  
During 2001, the US and most EU countries experienced an economic slowdown. Falling 
growth rates called the narrow “new economy” concept into doubt. Many observers have 
associated the concept with bankruptcies among dotcoms and other firms. However, 
productivity growth in the US remained high, despite the general downturn in the economy 
(Council of Economic Advisers 2002). Table 19 shows that growth in labor productivity as 
well as TFP growth increased considerably during the period 1995–2001 compared to 1973–
1995. Figures in Table 19 are based on a model that takes the effects of the business cycle on 
productivity into consideration. According to these calculations, structural labor productivity 
growth increased by 1.7 percentage points between the periods 1973–1995 and 1995–2001.
35 
The corresponding figure for structural TFP growth is 1.07 percentage points, i.e. a tripling of 
the pace in the 1973–1995 period. 
 
TABLE 19 ABOUT HERE 
 
The productivity performance of the US economy has intensified the debate about the effect of 
ICT on productivity throughout the whole economy. Research results have shown that 
investments in ICT play an increasingly important role for productivity growth. In recent years, 
however, several researchers have pointed out that a dramatic increase in productivity has only 
been experienced in a few industries (Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000; Gordon 2000).  
                                                 
34 The selection of 1996 as the initial year for the last period follows other productivity studies of the “new 
economy” such as Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Nordhaus (2001). The choice of final year is governed by data 
availability.   
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5.4 Productivity growth: Industry evidence 
Has ICT influenced productivity growth in the whole economy, or has productivity growth 
accelerated in just a few industries? To make an in-depth analysis, we present results from 
productivity calculations at the sectoral level for manufacturing. We begin by presenting 
detailed information for the US (Tables 20 and 21).
36 For the other countries, we present 
information for those three industries with the highest rate of productivity growth in 1996–
2000/01. Table 20 indicates that the compound annual labor productivity growth rate increased 
considerably in US manufacturing in 1996–2000. Compound annual labor productivity growth 
increased from 3.7 percent in 1990–1995 to 4.5 percent in 1996–2000. 
 
TABLE 20 ABOUT HERE 
 
Labor productivity growth increased in 13 out of 20 of the industries between 1990–1995 and 
1996–2000. This could indicate a spillover effect from ICT-producing to ICT-using 
industries.
37 However, a closer inspection reveals two industries in the US with much higher 
growth rates in labor productivity in the 1990s: Office, accounting and computing machinery 
(OAC) (ISIC 30) and Radio, television and communication equipment (RTC) (ISIC 32). The 
compound annual productivity growth rate for these two industries in 1996–2000 was 31.1 and 
20.8 percent, respectively. 
 
In Table 20 labor productivity is defined as production value per person engaged. Intermediate 
inputs are not deducted from the production value, which implies double-counting of 
intermediate inputs. Production value may therefore be a poor measure of output when industry 
trends are analyzed (Bailey 1986). Table 21 presents estimates of compound annual 
productivity growth for different US manufacturing industries in 1990–2003 defined as value 
added per person employed.
38 Table 21 confirms the result that the highest productivity growth 
                                                                                                                                                            
35 The structural labor productivity growth is defined as labor productivity growth minus the growth which is due 
to business cycle effects. 
36 In Table 20 labor productivity is calculated for the period 1980–2000 and is defined as production value per 
person engaged. The reason is that value added deflators were not available for all industries in the STAN 
database. In Table 21 labor productivity is calculated for the period 1990–2003 and labor productivity is defined 
as value added per person employed. Table 21 is based on figures from Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004) and 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005).  
37 We define spillovers as increases in labor productivity in the using sectors beyond what one would expect from 
the capital deepening effect alone. In other words, spillover effects are the contribution to TFP growth in the using 
sectors resulting from the introduction of the new technology. 
38 The productivity estimates are based on Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004) and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(2005). The BEA and BLS use the North American Industry Classification Standard (NAICS) instead of the 
International Standard for Industry Classification (ISIC) used by OECD (2003b). This implies that the estimates in 
Table 20 and 21 cannot be directly compared.  
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took place in the industry producing computers and communication equipment in 1990–2003. 
The compound annual productivity growth for Computer and electronic products (NAICS 334) 
was 26.6 percent in 1996–2003.
39 
 
TABLE 21 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results for the five European countries show much less evidence of spillovers to the rest of the 
economy. First, as already shown, there is no detectable increase in aggregate productivity 
growth compared to the mid 1990s. Second, compared to the US, there is little evidence of 
spillovers within manufacturing. Table 22 reports the three industries with the highest rates of 
labor productivity growth during 1996–2000/01.
40 In France, Sweden and Finland there were 
two ICT-producing industries that had the highest annual productivity growth. However, for 
Finland and Sweden OAC (ISIC 30) is not among the three sectors with the highest 
productivity growth. Instead, electric machinery and apparatus (ISIC 31) had the second 
highest labor productivity growth in Finland and medical, precision and instruments (ISIC 33) 
in Sweden. 
 
TABLE 22 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Germany, OAC (ISIC 30) had the highest productivity growth for the period 1996–2000. 
However, RTC (ISIC 32) ranks only third, with an annual productivity growth of 14.0 percent. 
For the UK OAC (ISIC 30) holds first place, but there are no data available for electric 
machinery and apparatus (ISIC 31) and RTC (ISIC 32).  
 
In all European countries investigated, an ICT-producing industry had the highest productivity 
growth. For Finland, France and Sweden the industry with the second highest growth was also 
ICT-producing. In Germany RTC had the third highest labor productivity growth. The 
comparison for the UK is incomplete, because of lack of data for some industries. 
 
5.5 Spillovers to the rest of the economy 
Aggregate data show that the US had very high aggregate productivity growth during the 
second half of the 1990s relative to the preceding twenty-year period. However, more 
disaggregated data for manufacturing shows that high productivity growth rates were 
experienced in just a few industries, notably in the ICT-producing industries, while 
                                                 
39 Computer and electronic products (NAICS 334) include computers and communication equipment.  
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productivity growth in ICT-using industries remained at levels similar to previous periods. 
Gordon (2000) argues that the productivity revival in the US occurred primarily within durable 
goods production and particularly in the ICT-producing industries. Should we then expect 
spillover effects to ICT-using industries in manufacturing and non-manufacturing? Evidence 
from the two earlier breakthroughs suggests that the large productivity gains were not realized 
until long after the introduction of the new GPT.  
 
David (2001) points out that the increase in TFP growth in the US in the 1920s was very 
evenly distributed across industries. In contrast, it appears that most of the productivity growth 
during the 1990s was very unevenly distributed across industries, most of it taking place in 
ICT-producing industries. Harberger (1998) makes a distinction between a “yeast-like” process 
of growth characterized by evenly distributed growth throughout most of the economy and a 
“mushroom-like” process with productivity growth in just a few sectors. David (2001) argues 
that the patterns of TFP growth were starting to move from a “mushroom-like” process to a 
“yeast-like” process in the late 1990s. 
 
Recent studies of productivity performance and ICT suggest that ICT has had substantial 
impact on productivity in a wide range of different industries and not only in the ICT-
producing industries. Stiroh (2002) and Van Ark et al. (2002) distinguish between ICT-
producing industries, intensive ICT-using industries and less intensive ICT-using industries.
41 
Stiroh (2002) finds that in the US, the ICT-producing and the intensive ICT-using industries 
accounted for all of the productivity revival (after 1995) that can be attributable to the direct 
contributions from specific industries. Oliner and Sichel (2000) also attribute a crucial role to 
the manufacture of computers, but they do not find that it accounts for all of the productivity 
increase. They estimate that use of ICT equipment together with improved production 
technology for computers account for approximately two-thirds of the increase in productivity 
growth in the US.
42 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
40 Information for Finland and Sweden is from 1996–2001 and for the UK from 1996–1999. 
41 Stiroh (2002) defines an intensive ICT-using industry as an industry with above median ICT share of capital 
services in 1995. Van Ark et al. (2002) largely base their distinction of ICT intensive and less ICT intensive 
industries on the definition provided by Stiroh (2002). 
42 As pointed out in section III the growth accounting framework used by Oliner and Sichel includes the portion of 
the effect of capital deepening on labor productivity that is the consequence of the accumulation of particular ICT 
capital goods. Field (2006a) argues that this is problematic since capital would have been accumulated in slightly 
inferior capital goods in the absence of ICT. Moreover, the growth accounting approach does not take spillover 
effects into account. Nevertheless, according to Oliner and Sichel (2000) TFP growth in computer production and 
computer related semiconductor production alone accounts for one fourth of the increase in labor productivity 
growth 1996–99 compared to 1991–95.  
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Europe lags the US in terms of productivity growth. Still, it appears as though productivity 
growth has increased in the ICT-producing industries also in Europe even though the pattern is 
somewhat different. Within manufacturing RTC (ISIC 32) has had astounding productivity 
growth in several countries, while computer manufacturing played a larger role in the US. The 
phenomenal growth in RTC is particularly pronounced in Sweden and Finland.  
 
Which sectors have accounted for increased productivity growth noticeable at the macro level 
in the US and why has not aggregate productivity growth increased in Europe? It appears that 
parts of the economy outside of manufacturing in the US have had a higher increase in 
productivity than corresponding sectors in Europe. McKinsey Global Institute (2001) maintains 
that the greater part of the increase in productivity in the US economy is concentrated in three 
sectors in addition to the ICT sector (semiconductors included): retail trade, wholesale trade 
and financial services. 
 
Table 23 shows that both the US and most EU countries experienced rapid increases in labor 
productivity in ICT-producing industries. According to van Ark et al. (2002) the contribution 
of these industries to aggregate productivity growth was slightly lower in the EU compared to 
the US. Moreover, the largest difference appears to have taken place in ICT-using services. 
According to Van Ark et al. the differential between the US and Europe is heavily caused by 
different productivity development in retailing, wholesale trade and financial Services. 
Estimates show that 0.90 percentage points out of a total productivity growth differential of 1.1 
percentage points between the US and Europe in the late 1990s emanated from these industries.  
 
TABLE 23 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 23 also shows that ICT-producing manufacturing and the ICT-using service sector were 
larger in the US compared to the EU, measured as a share of GDP. The ICT-producing 
manufacturing sector had a share of 2.6 percent of total GDP in the US compared to 1.6 
percent in the EU. The ICT-using service sector share of total GDP was 26.3 percent in the US 
compared to 21.1 percent in the EU. Thus, the sectors where productivity growth increased 
most during 1995–2000 were relatively larger in the US. 
 
5.6 Concluding remarks on the ICT revolution 
The transistor was invented in the late 1940s, but computers and cellular phones did not 
become consumer products until the 1980s. Aggregate labor productivity growth increased in  
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the US in the latter part of the 1990s. However, aggregate labor productivity growth did not 
increase to the same extent in the EU countries. Nonetheless, labor productivity growth was 
much faster in the ICT-producing industries compared to ICT-using industries for the US and 
for the five European countries that we have investigated for the period 1996–2001. Moreover, 
the aggregate productivity gap between the US and the EU was mainly due to productivity 
differences in retailing, wholesale trade and financial services. One possible reason for this 
could be that the US has been faster than Europe in implementing institutional and political 
changes that facilitate the exploitation of the economic potential of the new GPT (Litan and 
Rivlin 2001). 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
We have examined three technological breakthroughs and the development of subsequent 
productivity growth. We will now summarize and draw some conclusions from our 
investigation. Moreover, we discuss some measurement issues concerned with comparing 
productivity growth in different countries and for different time periods.  
 
6.1 Patterns of productivity growth after major technological breakthroughs 
When comparing technological breakthroughs it is important to keep in mind that every new 
technology has unique characteristics. Few technologies fulfill the requirements for being 
classified as a GPT or TEP. The three technological breakthroughs investigated here are 
different from each other. The interdependence between different technologies can also be 
highly complex. For example, electricity replaced the steam engine in the industrial production 
process, but the steam engine was also important initially as a primary source for producing 
electricity. Furthermore, the ICT revolution presupposed the existence of an extensive 
electricity network. These examples imply that technological breakthroughs cannot be 
analyzed solely as individual cases.   
 
We have shown that some major technological breakthroughs have impacted importantly on 
productivity growth in manufacturing, but also on aggregate productivity. It also appears that 
the impact of different key technologies has differed substantially across countries and 
industries. However, one major similarity for all three technological breakthroughs is that the 
productivity effects took place a considerable time after the initial innovation. David (1990, 
1991) argues that when considering technological paradigm shifts, with the potential to create 
the core of a new technological regime, a time scale of 40–50 years may be necessary for the  
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full impact of productivity growth to become evident in the conventional indicators. Our 
findings for the steam engine and the ICT revolution support David’s view. However, it took 
much longer from the time when the steam engine was invented until it had an impact on 
productivity growth (some 140 years) than for the electricity breakthrough and the ICT 
revolution, where 40–50 years elapsed before increases in manufacturing productivity growth 
rates could be observed. These findings suggest that it is not the technological invention that 
directly affects growth, but rather the additional innovations made to improve the new 
technology that is important for productivity growth (this will be discussed further below). 
Why does the process of additional innovation take so long? And what is the character of these 
innovations?  
 
Even though there are similarities between the productivity pattern following major 
technological breakthroughs, there are also important differences among them. The steam 
engine did not have a substantial impact on aggregate productivity growth in the UK until the 
1850s, i.e. 140 years after Newcomen’s original invention. The steam engine was not adopted 
by all sectors in the economy, but it was intensely used in a few key industries such as textile, 
coal mining and transportation. These industries also appear to have had a higher than average 
productivity growth (McCloskey 1981; Harley 1993). There is no clear evidence that the 
productivity growth associated with the steam engine in the UK took place in the industries 
producing the new technology. However, even though there are no direct statistical 
observations of high productivity growth in the steam engine producing industry, the price of 
steam power decreased substantially around 1850. This is a strong indirect indication of high 
productivity growth in the steam engine producing industry.  
 
Both quantitative and qualitative studies have provided evidence that electrification had a 
substantial but delayed influence on productivity growth in US manufacturing. Moreover, there 
was an increase in productivity in the electricity-producing sector. However, increased 
productivity growth was not discernible in the sector producing electric machinery. Kendrick 
(1961) suggests that compound annual TFP growth was 3.5 percent per year in the industry 
producing electric machinery in the 1919–1929 period, while manufacturing as a whole had a 
TFP growth of 5.1 percent p.a. during that period. This suggests that the productivity effects 
took place in sectors using electric machinery rather than in sectors producing it. 
 
David (1991) pointed out the relationship between increases in the rate of productivity growth 
and investments in electric motors. The same results cannot be found for Sweden. Moreover, 
even if there were substantial investments made in machinery with electric motors there was no  
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substantial productivity increase in this particular industry. This is a major difference compared 
to the ICT revolution, where productivity increased by far the most in ICT-producing 
industries. In section 4 it was shown that there was a substantial fall in real prices of electric 
motors during the period 1919–1929. Unlike the ICT revolution there are no consistent hedonic 
price indices for the periods covering earlier technological breakthroughs, which suggests that 
the productivity effects from earlier technological breakthroughs may be underestimated. 
 
For the ICT revolution we have seen large increases in the productivity growth for the sector 
producing ICT technology during the 1990s. However, it has not been possible to find 
evidence of spillover effects to other manufacturing industries. One of the reasons for the high 
labor productivity growth for the ICT-producing industries could be that hedonic price indices 
are used when deflating the value added for these industries. Still, this cannot be the whole 
explanation, since there are some countries with high productivity growth in the ICT-producing 
industries that do not use hedonic price indices, i.e. Finland, Germany, and the UK.
43 Despite 
the productivity increase in the ICT-producing industries it is only in the US that aggregate 
productivity growth has been at a significantly higher level compared to earlier periods. The 
increase in the productivity growth differential between the US and the EU in 1995–2000 can 
mostly be explained by differential productivity growth in retailing, wholesale trade and 
financial services.  
 
Another interesting point is the difference between the intensity of ICT use among ICT-using 
sectors. The major difference in productivity growth between the EU and the US has arisen in 
service industries with a high ICT intensity. Evidence from the steam engine revolution 
suggests that the industries using steam power technology intensely were those that had the 
highest productivity growth increases. The same pattern was observed for the US economy 
during electrification; productivity growth increases took place disproportionately in sectors 
that increased their use of electric motors in the production process.  
 
6.2 Measurement errors 
For the six countries studied we have shown that a large share of aggregate productivity growth 
in manufacturing during the latter half of the 1990s occurred in ICT-producing industries. A 
crucial assumption behind this result is that there are no systematic measurement errors. 
                                                 
43 Hedonic price indices are thoroughly discussed below.  
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However, there are a number of problems with measuring production and productivity and 
these problems are likely to have increased in recent decades.
44  
 
First, most countries in our investigation use double deflation to arrive at value added in fixed 
prices. Double deflation implies that the value of gross output and intermediate inputs are 
deflated separately with an output price index and an intermediate input price index, 
respectively. However, Finland has not introduced double deflation in their national accounts, 
which implies that inputs are not deflated separately. If double deflation were introduced in the 
Finnish national accounts, productivity for different industries would change. This especially 
holds for industries that are using inputs with rapidly shifting prices, like ICT products. Output 
of the ICT-producing industry is largely an input for other industries. This implies that the 
deflation of production value and value added in the ICT-producing industry greatly affects the 
distribution of productivity growth between ICT-producing and ICT-using industries. 
 
Second, it is almost impossible to construct completely true deflators for the ICT sector 
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000), where technology changes rapidly. Nordhaus (1997) argues that 
capturing the impact of new technologies on living standards is beyond the practical ability of 
official statistical agencies. The quality of the goods that we consume today is much higher 
compared to the quality of “the same” goods a decade ago. Countries use different methods to 
account for the rapid quality changes that take place. Sweden, the US, and France – but not 
Finland, Germany and the UK – use hedonic price indices for some of the ICT products. This 
has so far resulted in larger estimated quality improvements and thus volume increases (Pilat 
and Lee 2001).  
 
Different methods for capturing quality improvements can have a large effect on productivity. 
Edquist (2005b) shows that productivity levels in the ICT-producing industry in Germany, 
Sweden, and the US change substantially depending on which country’s value added price 
deflator that are used. Since there are no consistent hedonic price indices for the industries 
producing steam engines and electric machinery, it is likely that if quality adjustments had 
been made for their output, recorded productivity growth would have been higher for those 
industries as well.  
 
Edquist (2005a) constructs hedonic and matched model price indices for electric motors in 
Sweden for the period 1900–35. He finds that during the 1920s, PPI-deflated hedonic and 
                                                 
44 This problem was noticed by the so-called Boskin Commission (see Boskin et al. 1997), which calculated that 
the annual inflation rate in the US during the preceding quarter-century was overestimated by slightly more than  
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matched model price indexes decreased by 4.8 and 3.7 percent per year, respectively. This is a 
strong indication of high productivity growth in the industry producing electric motors in 
1919–29. Moreover, the difference between the hedonic and matched model price indices is 
only 1.1 percentage points. One reason for this is that the same quality characteristics are used 
for the hedonic and matched model price indices, i.e. speed, power and maximum voltage. It is 
likely, that productivity growth in electric machinery would have been considerably lower if 
these quality aspects were not taken into account. 
 
Third, the recent technological shift has given rise to enormous intangible investments in new 
business and production systems, personnel training, etc. Brynjolfsson and Yang (1997) 
estimate that each dollar invested in computer hardware is associated with intangible 
investments of 10 dollars. These intangible investments are usually treated as current costs and 
not as investments, which reduces value added and the growth rate (in the medium term). 
 
Fourth, an increasing share of production consists of services where deflation is often more 
difficult than for goods, since a larger share of the value depends on intangible characteristics 
(degree of accessibility, customer adaptation, delivery time, etc.). Van Ark and Smits (2002) 
argue that new product applications based on electricity were mainly concentrated to 
manufacturing, while the real challenge for ICT is to change the production processes in 
services. Research on the finance and health care sectors in the US has shown that 
measurement problems have led to underestimates of productivity growth (e.g., Cutler 2004).
45 
Thus, there are measurement problems that can cause both an underestimate of aggregate 
productivity growth, and an overestimate of increases in ICT production.  
 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
Our empirical investigation of three different technological breakthroughs suggests that it takes 
a long interval from the time of the original invention until a substantial increase in the rate of 
productivity growth can be observed. For the steam engine this period was about 140 years (85 
years if the Watt steam engine is treated as the original innovation), while it was around 40–50 
years for electrification and the ICT revolution. On the other hand, if we consider the high-
pressure steam engine as the innovation that paved the way for the real steam engine 
                                                                                                                                                            
one percentage point. 
45 Intuitively it is easy to understand that it can be particularly difficult to discriminate between price increases and 
volume in health care. When a new, more expensive drug replaces an existing drug, how should the cost increase 
be divided between increased effectiveness and increased prices? Perhaps the improved effectiveness is so great 
that there is actually a decrease in price, or the improvement is so marginal that almost all of the cost increase 
should be treated as a price increase.  
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revolution, then the time lag from innovation to greater rates of productivity growth is no 
longer for the steam engine than for the two subsequent technologies that we examine. 
 
From the theoretical literature on GPTs as well as from our investigation it seems as though 
both innovational complementarities and technological dynamism are crucial for productivity 
growth. This implies, that an invention by itself would have little effect on an economy if there 
is no scope for the users of the new technology to improve their own technologies, and if 
continuous innovational efforts would not increase the efficiency by which the generic function 
is performed. For example, innovations that made the steam engine more efficient had to occur 
before it was introduced in the industrial production process. Moreover, before electricity could 
be used in manufacturing several types of electric machines had to be invented.  
 
A further explanation for the delayed productivity effects is that it takes time to develop 
organizational innovations, i.e. systems that permit organizations to use new technology 
efficiently. At first the new technology may often just be performing the same function as the 
old technology, and in this process a great deal of existing productive capital will be 
“creatively destroyed” which further tends to delay the point where positive productivity 
effects at the more aggregate level can be observed (Greenwood 1997). Political decisions may 
also be called for before the full potential of the new GPT can be reaped. There may be strong 
vested interests tied to the old GPT, which manage to block reforms that would facilitate the 
deployment of the new GPT.  
 
Concerning the pattern of productivity growth after major technological breakthroughs we find 
evidence of rapid price decreases for steam engines, electricity, electric motors, and ICT 
products. This indicates rapid productivity growth in the industries producing the new 
technology. However, we cannot find strong direct evidence that the steam engine producing 
industry and electric machinery had particularly high productivity growth rates. For the ICT 
revolution the highest productivity growth rates has been found for the ICT-producing 
industry. There is thus no clear evidence of any particular productivity growth pattern after 
major technological breakthroughs. We argue that one explanation for the high productivity 
growth rates in the ICT-producing industries could be that no hedonic price indexes were used 
for the steam engine and the electric motor. Further research is called for to investigate the 
impact on productivity growth if hedonic price indexes are used for steam engines or electric 
motors. Another explanation could be that the technological development of semiconductors 
and integrated circuits could not be matched by the steam engine or the electric motor. There is  
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simply no equivalent to “Moore’s law” for other technological breakthroughs than the ICT 
revolution.   
36 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1  Crude estimates of steam power capacity in different countries 1840–1896 
(thousands of horsepower) 
 
Thousands of Horsepower  Countries 
 







Austria  20  100 333  800  1,560 2,150 2,520  9.0  6 
Belgium  40 70  160  350 610 810  1,180  6.2  18 
Denmark n.a.  n.a.  10  30  90  150  260 n.a.  11 
France  90  370  1,120  1,850 3,070 4,520 5,920  7.8  15 
Germany  40  260 850 2,480 5,120 6,200 8,080  9.9  15 
Italy  10 40  50 330 500 830  1,520  9.4  5 
Netherlands  n.a. 10  30 130 250 340 600  n.a.  12 
Norway n.a.  n.a.  10  40  90  180  410  n.a.  20 
Portugal  n.a.  n.a.  10  30 60 80  170  n.a.  3 
Russia  20  70 200  920  1,740 2,240 3,100  9.4  3 
Spain  10 20  100  210 470 740  1,180  8.9  7 
Sweden  n.a.  n.a.  20 100 220 300 510  n.a.  10 
Switzerland  n.a.  n.a.  90 140 230 290 580  n.a.  19 
UK  620 1,290  2,450  4,040 7,600 9,200  13,700  5.7  34 
US 760  1,680  3,470  5,590  9,110  14,400  18,060  5.8  25 
The  World  1,650 3,990  9,380 18,460 34,150 50,150 66,100  6.8  n.a 
 
Note: The steam power capacity figures include capacity of fixed, railway and shipping steam power. The figures 
of steam power per 100 inhabitants are based on steam power capacity in 1896 and population figures in 1897.  
n.a. = not available. 
 





Table 2  Growth during the British industrial revolution, 1760–1913 (percent p.a.) 
 
Crafts  Output  Capital stock  Labor force  Labor productivity  TFP 
1760–1780 0.6  0.25  0.35  0.25  0.0 
1780–1831 1.7  0.6  0.8  0.9  0.3 
1831–1873 2.4  0.9  0.75  1.65  0.75 
1873–1899   2.1  0.8  0.55  1.65  0.75 
1899–1913   1.4  0.8  0.55  0.85  0.05 
Feinstein          
1760–1780 1.1  0.5  0.4  0.7  0.2 
1780–1831 2.7  0.7  0.7  2.0  1.3 
1831–1860 2.5  1.0  0.7  1.8  0.8 
 
Note: Weights: Crafts: capital 0.4, labor 0.6; Feinstein: capital 0.5, labor 0.5. 
 




Table 3  The contribution of steam technology to British labor productivity growth, 
1760–1910 (percent p.a.) 
 
 1760–1800  1800–30  1830–50  1850–70  1870–1910 
Stationary Steam 
engines 
       
Capital deepening  0.004  0.02  0.02  0.06  0.09 
TFP 0.005  0.001  0.02  0.06  0.05 
Total  0.01 0.02 0.04  0.12  0.14 
         
Railways         
Capital deepening  –  –  0.14  0.12  0.01 
TFP –  –  0.02  0.14  0.06 
Total –  –  0.16  0.26  0.07 
         
Steamships         
Capital  deepening  – – –  0.02  0.05 
TFP  – – –  0.01  0.05 
Total  – – –  0.03  0.1 
         
Total Steam 
Technology 
0.01 0.02 0.20  0.41  0.31 
 
Note: The total steam technology contribution is based on the combined impact of capital deepening and TFP 
growth from stationary steam engines, railways and steamships. 
 




Table 4  Steam power by industry in the UK, 1800–1907 
 
 1800  1870  1907 
Industry Number  of 
engines 
% Steam  HP 
(power in use) 
% Steam  HP 
(power in use) 
% 
Mining  1,064 48.6  360,000  26.2 2,415,841 26.5 
Textiles  469  21.4  513,335  37.4 1,873,169 20.5 
Metal  manufactures  263  12.0  329,683  24.0 2,165,243 23.7 
Food and drink trades  112  5.1  22,956  1.7  266,299  2.9 
Paper manufactures  13  0.6  27,971  2.0  179,762  2.0 
Building trades  12  0.6  17,220  1.3  347,647  3.8 
Chemicals 18  0.8  21,400  1.6  182,456  2.0 
Public utility (water-
works, canals, etc.) 
80 3.7 36,000 2.6  1,379,376  15.1 
Others 160  7.3  44,375  3.2  309,025  3.4 
Total  2,191 100 1,372,940 100 9,118,818 100 
 




Table 5  Crude estimates of annual total factor productivity growth for different UK 
industries, 1780–1860 
 
 McCloskey  Harley 
Cotton 2.6  1.9 
Worsteds 1.8  1.3 
Woolens 0.9  0.6 
Iron 0.9  0.9 
Canals and Railways  1.3  1.3 
Shipping 0.5  0.5 
Agriculture 0.4  0.7 
All others  0.02  0.02 
 





Table 6  Available horsepower capacity in US manufacturing, 1869–1954 (thousand 
horsepower) 
 








1869 2,346  2,346     
1879 3,411  3,411     
1889 5,845  5,845    16 
1899 9,811  9,633  178  297 
1904 13,033  12,605  428  1,089 
1909 18,062  16,393  1,669  2,913 
1914 21,565  17,858  3,707  4,684 
1919 28,397  19,432  8,965  6,647 
1923 32,667  19,426  13,241  8,796 
1925 34,359  19,243  15,116  9,976 
1927 38,236  19,336  18,900  11,201 
1929 41,122  19,328  21,794  12,050 
1939 49,893  21,077  28,816  16,011 
1954 110,181  35,579  74,602  19,514 
 
Note: Primary electric motors are those driven by purchased electricity. Secondary motors are 
driven by self-generated electricity and are excluded from total primary power available. 
 





Table 7  Degree of electrification in six industry groups: Britain and the US, 1904–
1924 (percent) 
 
Industry    1904  1907 1909 1912 1919  1924 
UK   5†   6   18  Cotton textile 
US 7   19   53   
UK    8   22  46  Iron and steel 
US  12   25   46  
UK   43    74  92  Engineering, shipbuilding  
and  vehicles  US  32   65   72  
UK   19    31  66  Chemicals and allied 
US  16   42   59  
UK   4‡    20  43  Coal mining 
US  n.a.  20   53   
 
Note: †All textiles, ‡All mining 
 




Table 8  Electric motor capacity in different Swedish industries (horsepower) and 
percentage change, 1913–1931 
 
  Electric motor capacity  Percentage change 






Ore-mining and metal industries  158,984 384,699 582,253 142  51  266 
Non-metallic mining and quarrying   22,470 56,252 92,535 150  65  312 
Wood and cork  27,632 79,292 152,428 287  92  452 
Paper and paper products, printing 
and allied industries 
134,355 225,460 580,674 68 158 332 
Food manufacturing industries  28,152 64,505 132,365 129  105  370 
Textiles, wearing apparel and 
made-up textile goods 
34,708 63,988 98,019 84 53 182 
Leather, furs and rubber products  6,165 15,663 26,342 154  68  327 
Chemicals and chemical products  13,134 31,691 45,033 141  42  243 
Power, lighting and waterworks  6,095 17,461 22,916 186  31  276 
Total 431,695 939,011 1,732,565 118  85  301 
 
Note: The percentage change refers to the whole period, not percent p.a. 
 




Table 9  Compound annual growth rates of labor and total factor productivity in the 










Note: Labor productivity is defined as output per manhour. LP = labor productivity; TFP = total 
factor productivity. 
 
Source: Kendrick (1961) and authors’ calculations. 
Period Labor  productivity  TFP 
1889–1901 2.9  2.2 
1901–19   1.7  1.1 
1919–29 2.3  2.0 
1929–41 2.4  2.3 





Table 10  Compound annual growth rates of labor and total factor productivity in US 
manufacturing, 1889–1948 
 
Period  Field Period  Kendrick 
 LP  TFP    LP  TFP 
     1889–99  1.4  1.1 
     1899–1909  1.3  0.7 
1889–1919 1.3  0.7  1909–19  1.1  0.3 
1919–29 5.5  5.1  1919–29    5.5  5.1 
1929–41 2.6  2.6  1929–37    2.0  1.5 
1941–48 0.2    –0.5  1937–48  1.5  1.7 
 
Note: Labor productivity is defined as output per manhour. 
 









Source: Du Boff (1979). 
 












1954 67.7  
51 
 
Table 12  Compound annual growth rates of labor and total factor productivity in US 
manufacturing, 1899–1937 
 
Industry  1899–1909 1909–1919 1919–1929 1929–1937 
  LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP 
Food  0.6 0.3  0 –0.4  5.2 5.2 0.9 1.5 
Beverages  1.3  0.9 –6.6  –5.8 0.5 –0.2  13.5  14.1 
Tobacco  1.7 1.2 5.9 4.8 7.0 4.3 7.3 6.1 
Textiles  1.4 1.1 1.7 0.9 2.4 2.9 4.3 4.5 
Apparel  0.9 0.7 3.3 2.7 3.9 3.9 2.1 2.5 
Lumber  products  –0.2 –0.4 –1.0 –1.2  2.9  2.5  –0.2  0.4 
Furniture  –0.7 –0.8 –0.4 –0.5  4.2  4.1  0.3  0.5 
Paper  3.0 2.4 0.5 0.3 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.2 
Printing,  publishing  3.9 3.8 3.2 3.0 3.7 3.7 2.6 2.6 
Chemicals  1.3 0.6  –0.3  –0.7  7.9 7.2 3.0 3.0 
Petroleum,  coal  products  3.0 0.7 1.8  –1.0  8.6 8.2 5.5 2.7 
Rubber  products  2.5 2.2 7.6 7.1 8.1 7.4 3.4 3.9 
Leather  products  0.5 0.1 0.9 0.5 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.5 
Stone,  clay,  glass  2.7 2.2 1.0 0.7 6.1 5.6 1.7 2.2 
Primary  metals  3.7  2.6 –0.4  –0.5 5.6  5.4 –0.9  –1.3 
Fabricated  metals  2.8 2.3 2.0 1.8 5.0 4.5 0.5 1.0 
Machinery,  nonelectric  1.8 1.0 0.7 0.7 2.9 2.8 1.9 2.2 
Electric  machinery  1.3 0.6  0  0.3 3.9 3.5 2.8 3.1 
Transportation  equipment  1.3 1.1 7.4 6.8 8.7 8.1  –0.2  –0.4 
Miscellaneous  1.1 0.8  –0.6  –0.6  5.3 4.5 2.2 2.8 
Total  Manufacturing  1.3 0.7 1.1 0.3 5.4 5.1 2.0 1.9 
 
Note: Labor productivity is defined as output per manhour. LP = labor productivity; TFP = total factor 
productivity. 
 








Industry 1925–1929  1929–1938  1925–1938 
Stone and soil production  6.2  –1.9  0.6 
Metal producing industry†  6.6  –0.3  1.8 
Metal processing industry†  8.1  1.3  3.4 
Chemical industry  6.7  4.1  4.9 
Textiles –0.8  3.5  2.2 
Leather production  0.4  1.3  1.0 
Clothing industry  –2.4  4.9  2.7 
Wood products  0.8  0.9  0.8 
Paper products  4.5  0.7  1.9 
Food production  1.2  1.4  1.3 
Gas, water and electricity  4.5  2.2  2.9 
Construction†† –1.6  2.5  1.3 
Total 2.8  2.4  2.5 
 
Note: Labor productivity is defined as output per worker. †Employment was only available for the 
total metal producing and processing industry. It is therefore assumed that the change in 
employment was the same in these industries in 1925–38. ††Labor productivity estimates for 
Construction are for the 1926–38 period. 
 





Table 14  Compound annual growth rate of labor productivity in different Swedish 
industries, 1913–39 
 
Industry 1913–1919  1919–1929  1929–1939 
Ore-mining and metal industries  –2.8  4.3  2.5 
Non-metallic mining and quarrying   –3.7  4.7  4.6 
Wood and cork  0  0.3  1.0 
Paper and paper products, printing 
and allied industries 
–2.2 4.4 2.6 
Food manufacturing industries  –0.1  3.0  1.8 
Textiles, wearing apparel and 
made-up textile goods 
–1.0 1.7 0.8 
Leather, furs and rubber products  –2.8  0.1  0.8 
Chemicals and chemical products  –6.3  11.2  3.8 
Power, lighting and waterworks  –0.4  7.7  4.9 
Total –1.7  3.8  2.0 
 
Note: Labor productivity is defined as value added per worker. 
 




Table 15  Price series of electric motors produced by Luth&Rosén, 1919–1929 
(SEK/horsepower) 
 












Index‡ CPI  Real 
index 
1919  335 250 232 189 160 100 100 100 
1920  319 237 215 175 148  93.5  100.4  93.2 
1921  195 143 128 106  89 56.4  86.2  65.4 
1922 157  114  100  84  53  42.6  69.8  61.1 
1923  110  78 71 58 47  30.9  64.9  47.6 
1924  122  86 74 63 48  33.3  64.9  51.3 
1925  103  71 54 49 39  26.6  66.0  44.8 
1926  103  71 54 49 39  26.6  63.8  41.7 
1927  125  86 67 60 48  32.5  63.1  51.5 
1928  112  78 61 53 44  29.3  63.4  46.2 
1929  111  77 60 54 45  29.3  62.7  46.7 
 
Note: ‡The index is an equally weighted price index of the 5 engines presented in the table above. All motors had 
the following characteristics: Alternating current, 1500 revolutions per minute, 190–500 V. 
 




Table 16  Labor productivity growth in Electric machinery in Sweden, 1913–35 
(percent p.a) 
 
Year Growth  rate 
  Hedonic deflation  Matched model deflation 
1913–1919   –7.2  –4.2 
1920–1929   12.1  10.8 
1930–1935   –2.5  –2.0 
1913–1935 3.0  3.8 
 
Note: Labor productivity is defined as production value per person employed. 
 










30  Office, accounting and computing machinery 
3130  Insulated wire and cable 
3210  Electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 
3220  Television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line 
telegraphy 
3230  Television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing 
apparatus and associated goods 
3312  Instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and 
other purposes, except industrial process equipment 
3313  Industrial process equipment 
 




Table 18  Average annual growth of GDP per person employed in selected countries, 
1980–2001 (labor productivity) 
 
Country 1980–89  1990–95  1996–2001 
Finland 2.5  2.5  1.9 
France 2.1  1.3  1.4 
Germany n.a.  2.2  1.6 
Sweden 1.6  2.5  1.9 
UK 2.2  2.0  1.6 
US 1.5  1.2  2.1 
EU–15 1.8  2.0  1.3 
 
Note: Calculations for Germany use growth figures beginning in 1992 due to the reunification 
with East Germany in 1990 and 1991. Figures for the period 1980–1995 have been taken from 
Scarpetta et al and figures for the period 1996–2001 are based on OECD (1998), OECD (2000), 
OECD (2002a) and OECD (2003a). n.a. = not available 
 




Table 19  Average annual growth rates of labor productivity and TFP in the US, 1973–
2001 
 
 1973–1995  1995–2001  Change  (percentage 
points) 
Labor productivity growth rate (percent)  1.39  2.60  1.21 
– Business cycle effect  0.02  –0.46  –0.48 
= Structural labor productivity  1.37  3.07  1.70 
– Capital services  0.72  1.29  0.57 
– Labor quality  0.27  0.31  0.04 
= Structural TFP   0.37  1.44  1.07 
 
Note: Labor productivity is the average of income- and product-side measures of output per hour worked. TFP is 
labor productivity less the contributions of capital services per hour (capital deepening) and labor quality. 
Productivity for 2001 is inferred from data for the first three quarters. 
 
Source: Council of Economic Advisers (2002). 
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Table 20  Compound annual growth rates of labor productivity in different US 
manufacturing industries, 1980–2000 
 
Industry ISIC  1980–89  1990–95  1996–2000 
Food products and beverages  15  2.7  1.7  1.9 
Tobacco products  16  1.5  4.3  0.3 
Textiles, textile products, leather and 
footwear 
17–19 2.6  4.0  5.5 
Wood and products of wood and cork  20  2.0  –0.2  0.7 
Paper and paper products  21  2.5  1.9  1.7 
Publishing and printing  22  1.1  –0.3  1.5 
Coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 
23 2.7 2.7  3.4 
Chemicals and chemical products  24  3.2  2.0  2.5 
Rubber and plastic products  25  4.0 2.9  3.3 
Other non-metallic mineral products  26  2.4 1.7  1.8 
Basic metals  27  2.9 3.5  1.3 
Fabricated metal products excl. machinery 
and equipment 
28  1.9 2.4  1.9 
Machinery and equipment  29–33 5.2  9.2 10.6 
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.  29 n.a. 3.5 1.7 
Office accounting and computing 
machinery 
30 n.a.  24.3 31.1 
Electric machinery and computing  31 n.a. 5.7 3.0 
Radio, television and communication 
equipment 
32 n.a.  18.3 20.8 
Medical, precision and optical instruments  33 n.a. 4.2 3.7 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  34 4.4 2.7 3.9 
Other transport equipment  35 0.9 0.8 3.5 
Manufacturing and recycling n.e.c.  36–37 1.7  2.0 2.9 
Total manufacturing  15–37  2.9  3.7 4.5 
 
Note: Labor productivity is defined as production value per person engaged. 
 




Table 21  Compound annual labor productivity growth in different US manufacturing 
industries, 1990–2003 
 
Industry NAICS  1990–95  1996–2003 
Food, beverage and tobacco products  311–312   4.0  –0.3 
Textile mills and textile product mills  313–314  4.0  3.0 
Apparel, leather and allied products  315–316  3.5  10.2 
Wood products  321   –3.6  1.2 
Paper products  322  0.8  1.1 
Printing and related support activities  323  –0.2  1.0 
Petroleum and coal products  324  6.6  3.2 
Chemical products  325  2.3  3.8 
Plastics and rubber products  326  3.7  4.0 
Nonmetallic mineral products  327  3.8  2.5 
Primary metals  331  3.8  3.5 
Fabricated metal products  332  3.1  1.5 
Machinery 333  –0.8  2.7 
Computer and electronic products  334  19.1  26.6 
Electric equipment, appliances and components  335  3.0  4.9 
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts  3361–3363  4.3  5.1 
Other transport equipment  3364–3366, 3369  –2.2  1.8 
Furniture and related products  337  2.0  –1.6 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  339  1.3  3.6 
Total manufacturing  31–33  4.1  5.8 
 
Note: Labor productivity is defined as value added per person employed. 
 






Table 22   The three manufacturing industries with the highest compound annual 
growth rate of labor productivity growth in five European countries 1996–
2000/01 
 
Country ISIC  Growth 
Finland    
Radio, television and communication equipment  32  19.9 
Electric machinery and apparatus  31  6.0 
Basic metals  27  4.2 
    
France    
Office accounting and computing machinery  30  21.2 
Radio, television and communication equipment  32  19.9 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  34  10.5 
    
Germany    
Office accounting and computing machinery  30  18.0 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  23  16.9 
Radio, television and communication equipment  32  14.0 
    
Sweden    
Radio, television and communication equipment  32  25.0 
Medical, precision and optical instruments  33  12.1 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  34  6.3 
    
UK    
Office accounting and computing machinery  30  7.5 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  34  3.8 
Other transport equipment  35  2.7 
 
Note: Labor productivity is defined as value added per person engaged. Figures for Sweden and Finland cover the 
1996–2001 period. Figures for Germany and France cover 1996–2000 period and figures for the UK are for the 
1996–1999 period. For the UK labor productivity is defined as value added/per person employed. 
 




Table 23  Annual labor productivity growth of ICT-producing, ICT-using and non-
ICT industries in the EU and the US, 1990–95 vs. 1995–2000 (percent) 
 
  Productivity growth  GDP share 
 United  States  EU  2000 
  1990–1995 1995–2000 1990–1995 1995–2000  EU  US 
Total  Economy  1.1 2.5 1.9 1.4  100  100 
ICT-producing  industries  8.1 10.1 6.7  8.7  5.9  7.3 
…ICT-producing  Manufacturing  15.1 23.7 11.1 13.8  1.6  2.6 
…ICT-producing  Services  3.1 1.8 4.4 6.5  4.3  4.7 
ICT-using  Industries†  1.5 4.7 1.7 1.6  27.0  30.6 
…ICT-using  Manufacturing  –0.3  1.2 3.1 2.1  5.9  4.3 
…ICT-using  Services  1.9 5.4 1.1 1.4  21.1  26.3 
Non-ICT  Industries  0.2 0.5 1.6 0.7  67.7  62.1 
…Non-ICT  Manufacturing  3.0 1.4 3.8 1.5  11.9  9.3 
…Non-ICT  Services  –0.4  0.4 0.6 0.2  44.7  43.0 
…Non-ICT  Other  0.7 0.6 2.7 1.9  10.5  9.8 
 
Note: †Excluding ICT-producing industries. Labor productivity is defined as value added per person employed. 
EU includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, which represents over 90 percent of the EU GDP.  
 





Figure 1  Electric motor capacity in the Swedish manufacturing and handicraft 
industries, 1906–1937 (horsepower) 
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